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Public procurement relies in an apparent irreconcilability between competition, which 
implies some confidentiality, and transparency. The latest Public Procurement Directives 
have made e-procurement a mandatory feature. Since blockchain technology has been 
developed and designed to accomplish integrity, transparency, efficiency and data 
accuracy, goals which are very much appreciated in public procurement, an interesting 
question then arises: is there room to apply this technology within public procurement 
procedures? Will smart contracts be an interesting tool within public procurement? 
Considering public duties such as data protection, which must be complied with by 
contracting authorities, and some blockchain features such as non- withdrawable 
information and the likely broad access to the information there enclosed, one can be 
drawn to conclude that there is no possible conciliation between these two procedures. 
The mandatory e-procurement implies some neighbouring problems with this technology. 
Yet, are there any technological solutions for some of the drawbacks?  
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Public procurement relies in an apparent irreconcilability between competition, which 
implies some confidentiality, and transparency. According to recital (2) of Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, ‘public procurement plays a 
key role in the Europe 2020 strategy, set out in the Commission Communication of 3 
March 2010 entitled ‘Europe 2020, a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’), as one of the 
market-based instruments to be used to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds’. Hence, public procurers have now 
some more complex goals to achieve and not only the market goal. Even though the 
Directives aim to harmonise legal regimes, their implementation varies according to the 
economic development of each Member State and their inner financial difficulties. These 
natural differences also make a difference regarding in the engagement in pursuing each 
additional goal inherent to sustainable procurement, determining the emergence of new 
tools.  
Since Blockchain technology has been developed and designed to accomplish integrity, 
transparency, efficiency and data accuracy, goals which are very much appreciated in 
public procurement, we intend to discuss whether there is room for applying this 
technology within public procurement procedures and whether this will be a better 
solution when compared to the present ones (section 2). The two main questions 
addressed in this paper imply thus the discussion of smaller ones. Therefore, after briefly 
explaining in what Blockchain technology consists, stressing its key features, its 
advantages and disadvantages (section 2.1.), and addressing the ‘smart contract’ tool 
(section 2.2.), we intend to confront Blockchain technology with the electronic platform 
solutions, identifying common problems.  
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As the premised framework of the analysis is the EU legal order and the latest Public 
Procurement Directives have made e-procurement a mandatory feature, we have chosen 
the Portuguese case of e-procurement implementation because not only does it have high 
rates of success, but also because it has been dealing with and solving some of the 
identified problems regarding technology. Hence, the case chosen does not intend to set 
aside other examples within the EU, but we figured that all Member States have 
experienced the same difficulties. Additionally, this section’s only aim is to help readers 
understand the technological framework (section 3). 
In section 4, bearing in mind the kind of legal requirements made by open public 
procurement procedure rules (and their legal safeguards regarding data protection, both 
personal and private), we will address some of the sensitive issues (section 4.1.) 
concerning the tender presentation, the evaluation phase under the award criteria, the 
choice of the best valued proposal, the habilitation phase and the contract conclusion. 
Then, in section 4.2., we will try to understand if those requirements fit the Blockchain 
way of working, including the ‘smart contract’ solution. Our goal is to verify if this 
technology is more adequate and suitable for public procurement than the present 
solutions of electronic platforms and traditional contract execution. Starting from some 
usable smart contract solutions, it will be possible to conclude that, although some of the 
key features of the technology are very welcome in public procurement, a set of 
difficulties in using this solution remains. Not only when addressing the procedure stage, 
where the sensitive problems regarding personal and confidential data are more evident, 
but also in contract execution, due to the general complexity of public contracts. 
Nevertheless, there is slightly room for a kind of public contracts, particularly if they are 
concluded under the best price award criterion and the main object is related to supply. 
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2. The Blockchain technology  
2.1. Preliminary remarks 
Blockchain began as a database of online transactions, which explains its features, mainly 
decentralisation and immutability. Nowadays, it is a distributed digital technology 
designed to accomplish integrity, transparency and efficiency.1 Blocks of information are 
constantly added and not redrawn, which can explain, alongside with cryptography, the 
transparency and accountability features. Once the data is verified through a consensual 
process by all the people involved (which also allows synchronisation), and then stored 
on several computers (nodes), it cannot be changed, therefore becoming immutable.2 It 
is, therefore, a distributed ledger.3 It is maintained by an algorithm, so ‘the transaction 
history [is] not to be managed by a central authority’ – therefore it is a decentralised 
database. It aims to ‘achieve resilience through replication’ – if a computer fails the data 
is nevertheless preserved.4 This copy distribution prevents the success of a cyber-attack. 
 
1 Michèle Finck states that it remains ‘in flux’ [‘Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown’, German Law 
Journal 19 (2018) 665 at 667]. 
2 Roland Berger, ‘Blockchain – A Promising Technology for the Belgian Public Administration’. 2018. 
Retrieved 8 October 2018 https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Publications/Blockchain.html. 
‘When a block is verified as ‘true and trustworthy’ via the consensus protocol, it is posted practically 
simultaneously to each consortium member’s copy of the distributed ledger. Each ledger has a unique hash 
Key calculated based on the precise content of all the transactions in the block’ (Jason Killmeyer, Mark 
White, Bruce Chew, ‘Will Blockchain Transform the Public Sector? Blockchain Basics for Government’, 
Deloitte Report https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4185_blockchain-public-
sector/DUP_will-blockchain-transform-public-sector.pdf). Nevertheless, Michèle Finck stresses that the 
immutability feature should be understood as such as far as there is no human intervention (Finck 
‘Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown’ (n 1), 665 at 668). See also, Angela Walsh, ‘The Path of the 
Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law)’, Review of Banking & Financial Law 36 (2017) 713 at 735 ff). Kevin 
Werbach, when addressing the security issues and the trust in smart contracts, also discusses the 
immutability in Ethereum (‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’, Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal 33 (2018) 490 at 517. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844409).  
  Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright, addressing the tamper-resistant feature, inform that it is possible, 
within Blockchain technology, ‘to determine whether a party is entitled to view, share, or modify data. Such 
an approach is already being explored in the context of health data and electronic medical records’ 
[Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 2018) 112]. 
3 Mark Giancaspro, ‘Is a ‘Smart Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights from a Legal Perspective, 
Computer Law & Security Report (June 2017) 1 at 3. 
 Angela Walsh discusses whether blockchain is in fact a distributed ledger. Walsh, ‘The Path of the 
Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law)’ (n 2), 713 at 765. 
4 Michèle Finck and Valentina Moscon, ‘Copyright Law on Blockchains: Between New Forms of Rights 
Administration and Digital Rights Management 2.0’, IIC – International Review of Intellectual Property 
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Additionally, each modification is spotted by all participants, which prevents 
unauthorised modifications.5  
Hence, it relies upon a chain of information which validates the existence and accuracy 
of the information provided in the distinct stages – the technology does not assure 
information quality, only the procedure accuracy. Trust is built upon the agreement of all 
the parties in the Blockchain to abide by the same protocol, which is why there are 
different moments and parties in the validation process.6 And the entire process is 
guaranteed by data encryption. Therefore, the inner accuracy of the information is a 
different question, because the truthfulness that can be guaranteed by Blockchain 
technology only goes as far as the kind of process used, not the inner truthfulness and 
accuracy of the information stored. This technology cannot solve any problems regarding 
untruthfulness, but it can exacerbate them as it is in general difficult to delete or change 
information (even if, in some cases, it is possible to have permissions to change or delete 
information).7 
The range of participants embraces transparency and ideally underpins efficiency. The 
‘cutting out [of] intermediaries’8 and the automation process improve financial efficiency 
through the reduction in administrative costs.9 Mark Giancaspro, reflecting upon smart 
contracts, also refers to the promised efficiency linked to the fact that they do not need 
 
and Competition Law 50(1) (2019) 77 at 89; Michèle Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 7. 
5 Finck ‘Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown’ (n 1) 665 at 670. 
6 As Michèle Finck says, ‘consensus protocols provide consistency among the many copies of the ledger’. 
The protocols are the ‘source of trust in the system’ (Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in 
Europe (n 4) 19-20). At least, the accuracy of gathering data but not inner accuracy. See infra. 
  Trust is a very valuable asset: ‘it creates reserves of goodwill that facilitate social interactions and business 
transactions’, Kevin Werbach, The Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England, 2018) 19. However, this trust is related to the whole system (ibid 96). 
7 Referring to these issues, Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of 
Code (n 2) 114 ff. 
8 Berger, ‘Blockchain – A Promising Technology for the Belgian Public Administration’ (n 2). 
9 Mark Giancaspro gives the example of the ‘contract formed via credit card purchase’ that, if the 
Blockchain technology is used, the transactions costs are completely avoided (Giancaspro, ‘Is a ‘Smart 
Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights from a Legal Perspective’ (n 3) 1 at 5). 
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the usual intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies, and so on: ‘this process of 
disintermediation improves efficiency by allowing the Blockchain to address all critical 
aspects of the transaction from record-keeping to auditing, monitoring and 
enforcement’.10 This kind of efficiency can be embraced in the contractual process as 
referred by Merit Kõlvart, Margus Poola, and Addi Rull, which includes an ‘overview of 
the past behaviour of contracting parties.’11 
Despite the above-mentioned advantages regarding efficiency, some difficulties have 
been identified: the inefficiency by design, high-energy consumption, the need to be 
upgraded in order to be functional at scale, and the technical limitations. These features 
seem to compel us to be cautious when embracing the technology: Blockchain is mainly 
technology the building of which is ongoing.12 
Both Blockchain’s governance and configuration vary. In fact, it seems more of ‘a class 
of technologies’ rather than one single technology.13 The main distinction is between 
public (permissionless) and private (permissioned) blockchains.14 As opposed to private 
blockchains, public blockchains involve several information holders. Public blockchains 
usually have no network access control, and no gatekeeper, since this technology was 
created without specific access controls from the beginning.15 Accordingly, to Michèle 
Finck and Valentina Moscon, ‘on such ledgers, transactions are publicly auditable, which 
ensures transparency but minimizes privacy.’16 Bearing in mind some of public 
procurement features, at least during procedure, we could think that a permissioned 
 
10 Ibid 4. 
11 Merit Kõlvart, Margus Poola, and Addi Rull, ‘Smart contracts’, in: Tanel Kerikma¨e and Addi Rull (eds) 
The Future of Law and eTechnologies (Springer, 2016) 134. 
12 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 1-2. 
13 Roman Beck, Christoph Müller-Bloch and John Leslie King, ‘Governance in the Blockchain Economy: 
A Framework and Research Agenda’ (Working paper), Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
9(10) (2018) 1020 at 1021. 
14 There are also hybrid forms of blockchains. 
15 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 14. 
16 Ibid 90. Regarding the privacy issues, see Finck, ibid 88-116. 
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solution wold be a better hypothesis to consider. On the other hand, after the period of 
information containment, there are some transparency obligations. And even at the 
beginning of the procedure, when considering an open procedure, access should be open 
to all possible economic operators.17 
In the meantime, though, some Blockchain experiences have been implementing control 
tools. Concerning private blockchain solutions, there is some network access control. Yet, 
the traditional control of local networks such as firewalls and virtual private networks 
may not be enough to achieve the security level expected from such technology. 
Nevertheless, as the Deloitte Report states, ‘blockchain can provide advanced security 
controls, for example, leveraging the public key infrastructure (PKI) to authenticate and 
authorise parties, and encrypt their communications’.18 Encryption requires a private key 
to allow access to the information. And this key is another security measure alongside 
encryption: when I store information in this technology, it only can be accessed by whom 
I give permission to. So, I maintain the sovereignty upon my data, which is a common 
goal with GDPR.19/20 When gathering decentralised, sequential hashing and 
 
17 At the beginning of an open procedure, the contracting authority does not know how many economic 
operators will be presenting a tender, nor their identity. 
18 ‘PKI is a set of roles, policies, and procedures required to create, manage, use, store, and revoke digital 
certificates and manage public-key encryption’, Eric Piscini, David Dalton, Lory Kehoe. ‘Blockchain & 
Cyber Security. Let’s Discuss’. Retrieved 9 October 2018 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/Technology/IE_C_BlockchainandCyberP
OV_0417.pdf. Michèle Finck recognises public Key infrastructure (PKI) and has as two important 
cryptographic tools (Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 28). 
  Describing the functioning of the private key, Michèle Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the 
European Union’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series 18-01 
(2018) 1 at 4 ff. 
19 See Article 20. We are addressing only one type of personal data: that is enshrined in the object of the 
transaction. However, the Blockchain embodies also metadata, which can also be considered personal data 
(the sender’s and recipient’s addresses and a timestamp can be considered as such, as the blockchain’s users 
are natural persons). 
20 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, has a scope of 
application. Our reflection is made under the premise of Member States of EU that are obliged under Public 
Procurement rules and therefore also under the scope of GDPR. 
Página 8 de 46 
 
cryptography, this system makes it quite difficult for anyone to tamper with information 
when you consider the main alternative of a database.21 Therefore, this private key serves 
at least one of the goals of data protection and data confidentiality and fulfils the 
requirements of authentication and authorisation.22 But as Kevin Werbach expressly 
states, ‘Blockchain-based systems are vulnerable’.23 Perhaps in a smaller degree 
regarding the Bitcoin solution, but higher in other Blockchain-basis solutions. 
Hence, there are still some risks, even when these security measures are deployed. There 
are user-related risks and code risks. 
Regarding user-related risks, at least two kinds of risks can be identified: the one of the 
key being stolen and those inherent to accessing networks from several computers.24 Key 
safeguard is important regarding cryptography and security.25 Although there are already 
powerful computers running 24/7 to break codes, it is very likely that in the future much 
more powerful computers – quantum computers – can achieve the break in lesser time.26 
So, even if I neither lose my key nor is it stolen, the technological risks exist.27 The other 
user security-related question, this one regarding the user behaviour, concerns the access 
 
21 In this sense, Piscini, Dalton, Kehoe ‘Blockchain & Cyber Security. Let’s Discuss’ 7. As Michèle Finck 
explains, ‘through this process, data is chronologically ordered in a manner that makes it difficult to tamper 
with information without altering subsequent blocks’, Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in 
Europe (n 4) 4. Data is trendily unaltered as a ‘collusion between the majority of the network’s nodes’ 
could in fact alter the data (ibid 4).  
22 Data protection is not the only problem related to blockchain technology. Privacy is another one and both 
of them ‘are two different concepts (but they are rights)’, Nicola Fabiano, ‘The Internet of Things 
ecosystem: the Blockchain and Data Protection Issues’, Advances in Science, Technology and Engineering 
Systems Journal 3(2) (2018) 5. 
23 Werbach, ‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’ (n 2) 490 at 515. Primavera Di Filippi 
and Aaron Wright also acknowledge that, although being resilient, this technology is not ‘immutable and 
can be attacked and manipulated by malicious parties’ (Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 
113); also Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 30. 
24 Referring precisely the ‘theft or disclosure of a private key’, Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the 
Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 114. 
25 Addressing this issue, within Bitcoin solution, Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind 
Narayanan, Joshua A. Kroll, Edward William Felten, ‘SoK: Research perspectives and challenges for 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies”, in: Proceedings of the 36th Ieee Symposium on Security and Privacy (2015) 
p. 104. 
26 For instance, there are some flaws regarding the random numbers generators.  
27 Werbach, ‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’ (n 2) 490 at 515. 
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from different computers. This kind of access adds another security issue, increasing both 
the possibility of breaking the code and the chances to steal the key. 
Beyond these security issues, there are also inner code risks. It is known that the 
technology (Bitcoin code) has code bugs and the inventor’s (Nakamoto’s) solution 
regarding this issue ‘is remarkably robust, but it can be overcome by a 51% attack’.28 
Regarding the public Blockchain, the most used consensus method is the proof-of-work: 
‘nodes contribute computing power to secure and maintain the system and engage in an 
economic competition (…) before they can propose a valid block to the nodes’.29 Each 
miner has to solve a puzzle and, when they reach the solution, that is seen as a proof of 
good faith ‘since it requires the miner to invest resources (CPU power and electricity) 
into updating the ledger. Nodes will only accept blocks which contain the solution to the 
puzzle.’30 This method implies an investment in energy and computational resources. Due 
to the excessive cost involved in this proof, mining pools – a ‘consolidation of miners’ – 
have been appearing, which allows the sharing of both rewards and transaction fees 
among miners. This solution ‘may further undermine the security of the network’ and 
may increase the ‘so-called 51% attack’. 31 In order to face some of the problems of this 
mechanism, other security methods are being tried. One of the new consensus protocols 
is the proof-of-stake: ‘participants must show a ‘stake’ in the system in order to participate 
in the protocol. An example would be a weighted raffle based on the number of coins 
 
28 Ibid 490 at 515. Addressing the security risks, Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule 
of Code (n 2)113 ff. 
29 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 20. Describing the proof-of-work (PoW) 
and proof-of-stake (PoS), Lin William Cong and Zhiguo He, ‘Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts’, 
(December 27, 2018). Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985764 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985764. 
    This system ‘imposes consensus on the precise order of transactions. Nodes are agreeing not just on what 
happened, but in what sequence it happened’. Werbach, ‘The Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust 
(n 6) 64. 
30 For more detailed and technical explanations, see Jean Bacon, Johan David Michels, Christopher Millard 
and Jatinder Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’. Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
268 (2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091218. 
31 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 21. 
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held by each participant.’32 But there are other protocols for distributed ledgers: ‘Proof of 
space, where participants must provide a specified amount of memory to compute the 
proof, in order to participate in the protocol’; ‘Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
(PBFT), a traditional, synchronous distributed consensus protocol. These protocols have 
been proved correct and their performance has been evaluated. They have been assumed 
to operate across a few tens of nodes, for which case they perform well, but they have not 
been used at large scale’; ‘earliest timestamp wins, [that] relies on trusting the timestamp 
generation hardware in the miners participating in the protocol. A hardware technology 
called ‘roots-of-trust’ could be built on’; and ‘Hashgraphs [which] have been proposed 
as an alternative to PBFT for lower overhead and increased scalability’.33 
What seems to be consensual is that the measures to secure distributed ledgers varies 
depending on the kind of technological solution34 and the field business it is applied to 
(banking sector, health, small commercial businesses and so on).35 
There are data protection-related issues regarding transparency and its connection with 
the keys, as a means to protect privacy. Hence, although presented as an advantage, 
transparency can also become a ‘concern’. The existence of private keys does not assure 
anonymization of the encrypted information because with the right key access to full 
disclosure is possible. That is why encryption is a pseudonymisation and, under Recital 
 
32 Bacon, Michels, Millard and Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’ (n 30) 1 at 15; Finck, Blockchain, 
Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 21. 
33 Bacon, Michels, Millard and Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’ (n 30) 1 at 15-16. 
34 ‘Permissioned blockchains do not provide the same assurance of non-interference because access is 
limited to identified parties’, Werbach, ‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’ (n 2) 490 
at 516. 
35 Werbach, ‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’ (n 2) 490 at 517. 
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26 of GDPR, is qualified as personal data.36 The risk of reidentifications is real.37 That is 
why relying on anonymity to maintain privacy can be misleading in Blockchain as there 
are techniques that can be used to identify the parties.  
Another data protection-related issue about Blockchain as a global decentralised system 
is the fact that there is no one that can be accountable for the protection of data, not even 
their owner.38 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was designed to deal with 
personal rights regarding technologies such as clouds, not for decentralised systems such 
as Blockchain technology.39 Therefore, apparently, there is a profound incompatibility 
between the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Blockchain.40  
So, features that are very appealing such as transparency and traceability are 
simultaneously weaknesses when observed from a data protection point of view. For 
Primavera di Filippi and Aaron Wright, ‘the transparency, resilience, and tamper 
resistance of a blockchain may undermine the effectiveness of these blockchain-based 
registries and other data management systems, crating security and privacy risks.’41 
 
36 In this sense, Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 10. Explaining some 
techniques that may overcome this pseudonymisation, ibid 11 ff. Javier Wenceslao Ibañez Jiménez points 
out that anonymity is assured ‘through the use of the sophisticated system of double asymmetrical key, 
grounded in the use of two distinct keys’, both public and private [Derecho de Blockchain y de la 
Tecnología de Registros Distribuidos (Aranzadi: Navarra, 2018) 43]. 
Recital 26 reads as follow: ‘Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be 
attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information 
on an identifiable natural person’. 
37 Primavera di Filippi and Aaron Wright give the example of the Netflix’s dataset deanomysation made by 
the University of Texas at Austin ‘simply by comparing rankings and timestamps with public information 
available at the IMDB database’ (Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code 116, footnote 43). Arvind 
Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, ‘Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets’. IEEE Symposium 
on Security and Privacy (SP) (2008) https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf. 
38 Michèle Finck explains the possibility of the data subject being, at the same time, data controller 
regarding their own personal data. Michèle Finck, ‘Smart Contracts as a Form of Solely Automated 
Processing under the GDPR’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Series, paper 
No. 19-01 (January 8, 2019), 6 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3311370); in the same sense, Bacon, 
Michels, Millard and Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’ (n 30) 45. 
39 As Michèle Finck points out, ‘whereas the GDPR was fashioned for a world where data is centrally 
collected, stored, and processed, blockchains decentralize each of these processes’, Finck ‘Blockchain and 
Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 1.  
40 Finck ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 1. 
41 Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 116. 
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Another appealing feature of this technology is data immutability, as it grants trust in the 
information gathered.42 Yet, one of the downsides of this feature is that information is, at 
least by principle, non-withdrawable information. This feature can raise a great deal of 
critical issues. Not only when inaccurate information is stored, but mainly when personal 
data is.43 When dealing with personal data, both EU and internal law establish the right 
to be forgotten and to delete personal information as an imperative feature. Given the fact 
that the owner of the data can be the data controller as well, they should be aware of this 
side of immutability. On the other hand, there are already some technical tools that can 
be used to address this problem: encrypted personal information,44 only accessed by 
private keys, can be ‘forgotten’, when private keys (belonging to the owner of the data) 
are forgotten, and the information is no longer accessible to or by anyone. Another tool 
is to write ‘the hash of transactions to it, while the transactions themselves are stored 
outside of the system’.45 
However, these features that we have been describing have been stressed as key features 
when Blockchain is related to Bitcoin. Whenever the technology is used for other 
purposes, the benefits are not always exactly the same. Hanna Halaburda expressly states 
that it has been ‘a challenge to create a decentralized, permissionless and secure 
blockchain to transfer assets other than a native cryptocurrency’. 46 The author identifies 
two major difficulties in applying this technology outside Bitcoin: (i) the gateway 
 
42 For Kevin Werbach, it represents ‘the time dimension of blockchain trust’, The Blockchain and the New 
Architecture of Trust (n 6) 101. 
43 Personal data is broadly defined in GDPR: ‘means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, 
an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’ [Article 4 (1)]. 
44 Still considered personal data under EU law, though. So, this kind of information, even encrypted, is 
subject to GDPR (Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 1). 
45 Piscini, Dalton and Kehoe, ‘Blockchain & Cyber Security. Let’s Discuss’ (n 18) 7. 
46 Hanna Halaburda, ‘Blockchain Revolution without the Blockchain’ (2018). Retrieved 4 March 2019 
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/san2018-5.pdf. 
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problem (which does not exist in Bitcoin as it is native): ‘whether the gateway is an 
individual, an institution or a consortium, it needs to be a trusted third party for subsequent 
users of the blockchain’; (ii) assuring immutability: ‘what makes the ledger immutable is 
the fact that adding a block to the blockchain is costly. (…) The network participants are 
rewarded for their costly work with bitcoins’ – without bitcoins, what could motivate the 
participants?47/48 
Consequently, people are choosing closed, permissioned Blockchains, which, although 
parting from the Blockchain technology with bitcoins, are driving away ‘because a 
blockchain without bitcoins is no longer virtually immutable without a trusted third 
party.’49 
So, one must conclude that this technology is already beyond its inception – 
cryptocurrencies – and seen as a new way to do business, even within the public 
administration.50 There are already some experiences in Sweden, the Republic of Georgia, 
the state of Illinois and the Republic of Ghana, regarding real estate 
transactions;51Antwerp, with birth registration; Australia, regarding police evidence from 
video cameras; the United Arab Emirates, with business registration, and logistics; and 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Addressing the cost issue of being a miner (the need for ‘expensive hardware to mine a new block’ and 
cost energy), Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 21. 
49 Halaburda, ‘Blockchain Revolution without the Blockchain’ (n 46) 8. 
50 Michèle Finck explains the possible Regulatory Strategies regarding blockchain technology. One of them 
is the issue of new legislation, pinpointing some examples in Arizona, regarding electronic signatures, 
Vermont, regarding blockchain evidences admissibility in court, and France, regarding crowdfunding 
(Finck, ‘Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown’ (n 1) 665 at 679). 
51 Explaining the ‘registries and Public Sector Information’, Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law 
– The Rule of Code (n 2) 109 ff.  
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Estonia, with a voting system.52 So we can foresee that the use of Blockchain will increase 
within the public sector.53 
 
2.2. Smart contracts as a new legal tool? 
Blockchain technology is also a ‘programmable platform’, which enlarges its usefulness 
beyond data storage. That is the reason why ‘smart contracts’ are usually related to 
Blockchain technology. 
A smart contract is an agreement that has an automatic execution, usually by computers.54 
Nick Szabo coined the term back in the 1990s, even though the legal concept appeared 
before Bitcoin.55/56 Michèle Finck stresses that, although there is an excitement around 
the concept, smart contracts are ‘little more than a deterministic if-then relation, it is plain 
 
52 This is one of the uses of Blockchain technology that relies upon immutability. Discussing the several 
meanings of the concept and how the feature is set to ‘sell’ the technology: ‘This is why so many see 
potential for blockchain technology to change systems including voting, government benefits, health 
records, insurance, and property records, among countless others. With certainty and permanence in our 
records, no one can cheat anymore, because cheating can always be called out with reliable records, and 
risks can be assessed more accurately across the board. Certainty and permanence are indeed potent tools, 
and if we have finally found these with blockchain technology, then it is small wonder that so many are 
celebrating’ (Walsh, ‘The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law)’ (n 2) 713 at 737). 
53 In this sense, Killmeyer, White and Chew, ‘Will Blockchain Transform the Public Sector? Blockchain 
Basics for Government’ (n 2) 2. By 2017, there were 117 Initiatives in 26 countries (ibid 3). The OECD 
analysis of data collected by The Illinois Blockchain Initiative (April 2018) shows 203 Blockchain 
Initiatives in 46 countries. Retrieved 8 December 2018 
http://www.oecd.org/parliamentarians/meetings/gpn-meeting-october-2018/OPSI-Blockchain-
Presentation-for-Global-Parliamentary-Network.pdf. 
54 As Max Raskin points out, although it is possible to find alternative and broader definitions of smart 
contracts”, for legal purposes, the key feature is the “excision of human control”, “The Law and Legality 
of Smart Contracts”,  Georgetown Law Technology Review 1 (2017) 305 at 309. The most common and 
old example is the vending machine. 
55 Nick Szabo, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks’, FIRST MONDAY 2(9) 
(1997). Retrieved 23 October 2018 http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469; Tim Swanson, 
‘Great Chain of Numbers: A Guide to Smart Contracts’ Smart Property and Trustless Asset Management 
67 (2014); Nick Szabo, ‘The Idea of Smart Contracts’ (1997), retrieved 
http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html; Aaron Wright, Primavera De Filippi, ‘Decentralized 
Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’, retrieved 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664 (2015); Kevin Werbach, Nico Cornell, 
‘Contracts Ex Machina’, DUKE Law Journal 67 (2017) 313-381; Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and 
the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 72 ff.   
56 Ethereum is one of the most important platforms regarding smart contracts. 
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that they have been a reality long before blockchain technology came along’.57 Or, if 
another definition should be given, a ‘small computer program that is deployed on a 
blockchain’.58 Contract rules are turned into programming language – the creative phase 
after which the software is frozen ‘while being added to the chain’59 – and it seems, at 
first glance, that these contracts no longer need ‘legal expertise’, as the ‘payment due for 
the contract could be executed automatically’ and ‘without possibility of interference by 
any party, and without the need of legal enforcement’.60 This feature is sometimes 
referred to ‘as ‘tamper-proof’ execution’ and this ability to perform ‘on its own’ is seen 
as the key that makes the ‘contract ‘smart’’.61  
 
But, for Michèle Finck, these ‘contracts’ are neither smart in ‘AI sense (they need outside 
output to determine real-world events)62 nor legal contracts’.63 
 
There are several examples of smart contracts in the cryptocurrency field, but also, as 
Michèle Finck states, in ‘automatic transfer of collateral in the event of default or to 
disburse employee compensation if performance goals are achieved’, ‘InsurTech for 
 
57 Finck, ‘Smart Contracts as a Form of Solely Automated Processing under the GDPR’ (n 38) 6. Therefore, 
the permanent order in bank online to transfer money is a smart contract; also, Halaburda, ‘Blockchain 
Revolution without the Blockchain’ (n 46) 5. 
58 Finck and Moscon, ‘Copyright Law on Blockchains: Between New Forms of Rights Administration and 
Digital Rights Management 2.0’ (n 4) 77 at 91. 
  Nevertheless, it should be noted that smart contracts are not necessarily linked to this technology (Finck 
and Moscon, ‘Copyright Law on Blockchains: Between New Forms of Rights Administration and Digital 
Rights Management 2.0’ (n 4) 77 at 92); Halaburda, ‘Blockchain Revolution without the Blockchain’ (n 
46). 
59 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 26. 
60 Eric Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Formalizing Contract Law for Smart Contracts’, Tilburg Private Law Working 
Paper Series 6 (2017) 2. 
61 Scott Farrel, Heide Machin, and Roslyn Hinchliffe, ‘Lost and Found in Smart Contract Translation – 
Considerations in Transitioning in Legal Architecture’, J.I.B.L.R. 33(1) (2018) 24. 
62 For Lin William Cong and Zhiguo He, smart contracts are not ‘entailing artificial intelligence (on the 
contrary they are rather robotic)’, Cong and He, ‘Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts’ (n 29) 8. 
63 Finck, ‘Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown’ (n. 1) 665 at 670; Werbach and Cornell, ‘Contracts Ex 
Machina’ (n 55) 313-381; Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 24-25; Kõlvart, 
Poola and Rull, ‘Smart contracts’ (n 11) 135. 
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event-driven insurance’64, ‘automatic compensation due to flights delay, car leasing 
contract,65 tax compliance,66 freight and logistics industry,67 not to mention the most cited 
of vending machines.68 In these law fields, smart contracts are seen as an efficient 
‘consumer rights enforcement’.69 Hence, Blockchain technology can be suitable ‘to track 
movement of goods and payments’, within international commerce,70 smart energy 
grids,71 micropayments related to ‘ecosystems of peer-to-peer transactions’, collaborative 
platforms, and so on.72 
 
The common feature in all those examples is the clause simplicity of the contracts. And 
the advantages of the technology above-mentioned are identifiable in this field: the lower 
 
64 Stan Higgins, ‘AXA Is Using Ethereum’s Blockchain for a New Flight Insurance Product’ (coindesk, 13 
September 2017). Retrieved 4 March 2019 https://www.coindesk.com/axa-usingethereums-blockchain-
new-flight-insurance-product/. 
65 This is the example given by Hanna Halaburda: ‘upon a missed payment, the car would automatically 
lock, and control would return to the lender’ (Halaburda, ‘Blockchain Revolution without the Blockchain’ 
(n 46) 5). 
66 Although the experience has been the ‘first iteration of the employment tax use case, and therefore 
addressed only part of governments’ complex tax requirements’, the US experience was based on the idea 
of cost reduction (‘Code as Law: Using Ethereum Smart Contracts to Ensure Compliance with Federal Tax 
Law’. Retrieved 4 March 2019. https://media.consensys.net/code-as-law-using-ethereum-smart-contracts-
to-ensure-compliance-with-federal-tax-law-3fc67cb7b956. 
67 Cong and He, ‘Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts’ (n 29) 17. 
68 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 5.  
  For the use of smart contracts in corporate finance and governance, see David Yermack, ‘Corporate 
Governance and Blockchains’, Review of Finance (2017) 7 at 26.  
69 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 5. As the author states, the 
German government has ‘set out to evaluate smart contracts in relation to consumer contracts’. 
Martin Fries, ‘Law and Autonomous Systems Series: Smart consumer contracts – The end of civil 
procedure?’. Retrieved 4 March 2019 https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/03/smart-
consumer-contracts-end-civil-procedure. 
70 Some law firms, regarding international contracts, are working in digital terms related to insurance, 
‘outlining key terms … and modelled an Ethereum-based smart contract based on this term sheet to govern 
relevant payouts’. The experience allowed the comparison between smart contract and natural language 
one and the identifications of some legal vulnerabilities [Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – 
The Rule of Code (n 2) 77-78]. The example is from Steven Norton, ‘Law Firm Hogan Lovells Learns to 
Grapple with Blockchain Contracts’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 February 2017). Retrieved 9 March 2019 
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/02/01/law-firm-hogan-lovells-learns-to-grapple-with-blockchain-
contracts/. 
    For a more detailed overview of this issue, see, for instance, Harry Surden, ‘Computable Contracts’ UC 
Davis Law Review 46 (629) (2012). Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2216866. 
71 About Blockchain and its use in the energy sector, with some examples, Dentons, ‘Blockchain in the 
Energy Sector: Evolving Business Models and Law’, International Energy Law Review 7 (2018) 233-269. 
72 Finck, ‘Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown’ (n 1) 665 at 671 ff. 
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transactions costs and the reduction of ‘counterparty risk and interpretative uncertainty’.73 
Therefore, smart contracts are expected to be the end of court disputes and the guarantee 
of full transparency in both contract conclusion and execution.74 Even though their 
effects, as Michèle Finck stresses, can be altered by another smart contract.75 They are 
presented as an alternative to traditional contracts.76/77 
But the disadvantages of Blockchain technology identified above are mirrored in smart 
contracts, namely regarding security.78 The contract code can have bugs, the access key 
can be broken, and user behaviour can endanger its security. In March 2015, the Ethereum 
Foundation commissioned a security report79 from Least Authority about the Ethereum 
Virtual Machine containing best-practice recommendations.80 
 
This technology is being pointed out as adequate for contract execution. 
 
73 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 25. Primavera di Filippi and Aaron 
Wright also point out that this feature also favours ‘new avenues for commercial relationships, potentially 
facilitating an increasing range of economic activities between untrusting parties’ (Di Filippi and Wright, 
Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 81). 
74 This advantage can be misleading as the smart contract does not enshrine the guarantee of no dispute at 
all. That is why it has been discussed how ‘arbitration mechanisms’ could be included in sophisticated 
smart contracts. See Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 27; Finck, ‘Blockchain 
and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 25. 
75 Finck, Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 25. 
76 Addressing several relevant issues concerning contract formation such as capacity, contracting under 
mistake, the moment of agreement, connection between related contracts, certainty of terms, remedies and 
interpretation, Giancaspro, ‘Is a ‘Smart Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights from a Legal Perspective, 
Computer Law & Security Report (n 3) 1 at 6 ff. 
77 Primavera di Filippi and Aaron Wright address the possibility of replacement from a privacy issue point 
of view: the ‘privacy issues may limit the potential for smart contracts to replace traditional legal contracts 
in many commercial settings. Without strong privacy protections, smart contracts likely will prove 
unsuitable for legal agreements where confidentiality is crucial’, (Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and 
the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 83). Referring to this concern, Brydon Wang Allens, ‘Blockchain and the 
law’ Internet Law Bulletin 19 (1) (2016), 250-254. 
78 Addressing security issues in smart contracts, Werbach, ‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs 
the Law’ (n 2) 490 at 517.  
79 Retrieved https://github.com/LeastAuthority/ethereum-analyses/blob/master/GasEcon.md#callstack-
depth-limit-errors. 
80 Zikai Alex Wen and Andrew Miller state that most of those recommendations were ignored (‘Scanning 
Live Ethereum Contracts for the ‘Unchecked-Send’ Bug’, retrieved 
http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/16/scanning-live-ethereum-contracts-for-bugs/. 
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The contractual obligations are translated into programming language or ‘contractware’.81 
One of the advantages of computer language, when compared to the traditional one, is 
less ambiguity, ‘because there are simply fewer terms that a computer can recognise than 
a human can’.82  
Although it may seem a new, ‘perfect’ way of contracting, the smart contract execution 
method raises several legal questions. 
First, the feature of language simplicity and accuracy only applies to very basic contracts, 
mainly those which entail simple obligations and are plain executions of law basics.83 
And it is imperative, in each smart contract, to assess if the contractual provisions in a 
code are valid and effective under law.84 
The inherent immutability regarding code language does not allow the contract to keep 
up with changing circumstances; the occurrence of partial breach of contract by one of 
the parties; and the consideration of non-compliance due to third-party involvement. In 
other words, if the programming language equals ‘if/then’ clauses, how are particular 
circumstances that do not meet the if-clause to be considered? A computer cannot 
recognise imperfect performance unless all the possible conditions are turned into 
computer language and the consequences are set out as well.85 Therefore, the described 
 
81 That is, ‘physical or digital instantiations of contract terms onto machines or other property involved in 
the performance of the contract’, Raskin, ‘The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts’ (n 54) 305 at 307. 
82 Predictability and unambiguity are the features that allow the execution of smart contracts without 
performance problems (in this sense, Farrel, Machin and Hinchliffe, ‘Lost and Found in Smart Contract 
Translation – Considerations in Transitioning in Legal Architecture’ (n 61) 25). Identifying the ‘inherent’ 
flexibility and ambiguity of natural language of law, Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The 
Rule of Code (n 2) 199. 
83 Being a technology, code language can become more and more complex and it can evolve and embrace 
more sophisticated clauses. 
84 Farrel, Machin and Hinchliffe, ‘Lost and Found in Smart Contract Translation – Considerations in 
Transitioning in Legal Architecture’ (n 61) 24 at 25. 
85 Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright acknowledge these types of problems (Di Filippi and Wright, 
Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 200). Recognising these concerns, Sope Williams-Elegbe, 
‘Public Procurement, Corruption and Blockchain Technology: A Preliminary (Legal) Inquiry’. 2018. 
Inaugural lecture delivered on 25 October 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018 
https://www.sun.ac.za/english/Documents/newsclips/InauguralLecture_ProfSopeWilliamsElegbe_23Oct2
018.pdf. 
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immutability in smart contracts should be seen as a disadvantage per se, related to the 
difficulty in translating legal clauses into code. This difficulty, in my belief, should not 
be confused with the recognised (and needed) existence of some uncertainty regarding 
the definition of legal contracts,86 and that can explain other ways of legal binding such 
as Heads of Agreements, Memorandums of Understanding, Letters of Comfort, Side 
Letters and Letters of Intent.87 Furthermore, it should not be confused with non-concluded 
contracts: a contract can be concluded if the parties have already agreed upon the essential 
obligations, but they are not obliged to agree upon every other obligation. They can also 
agree to agree later on upon eventual circumstances that may or may not arise.88/89 
The need to accommodate future changes in public contracts is recognised upfront by the 
legislator, foreseeing discretionary clauses or concepts. These provisions imply an 
exercise of reason, discretionary powers or a judgement of foresight, and making the if-
clause inadequate and useless.90 In fact, most contracts are far more complex than the 
simple if/then rule.91 Yet, it should also be pointed out that it is very oversimplified to 
 
86 Depending on the legal order (either Anglo-Saxon law or continental law), some contracts rely upon legal 
provision to solve any unforeseen regulation in the contract such as abnormal and/or unpredictable change 
of circumstances. This kind of unforeseen regulation relies, for instance, in continental law, upon the civil 
code’s provision. 
87 Ralph B. Lake and Ugo Draeta, Letters of Intent and Other Precontractual Documents. 2nd Edition. (New 
Hampshire, 1994). 
88 Of course, always within the legal contractual autonomy. Even in public contracts, the 2014 Directives 
foresee the possibility that in contract execution there can be contract modifications in several situations. 
One of them is when that possibility is previously foreseen in public procurement procedure documents. 
89 Addressing the transaction costs within the so-called ‘incomplete contracts’, Jean Tirole, ‘Cognition and 
Incomplete Contracts’, American Economic Review 99(1) (2009) 265-294. 
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.1.265.I. Idem, ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do 
We Stand?’, Econometrica 67(4) (1999) 741-781. Retrieved http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999457. 
Nevertheless, the incompletion of a contract cannot mean the hiding of essential elements from the other 
contractual partner or the misleading about its features. In these cases, there can be a lack of agreement 
upon the essentials of the contract or the contract may be void. Of course, there are costs in foreseeing all 
the future needs of the contractual relationship. At least in continental law, usually the civil code has 
provisions to solve this kind of situations. 
90 Farrel, Machin and Hinchliffe, ‘Lost and Found in Smart Contract Translation – Considerations in 
Transitioning in Legal Architecture’ (n 61) 24 at 25. 
91 Max Raskin, in a simple analysis, states: ‘the enforcement of a contract is nothing more than the running 
of a circumstance through a conditional statement’. Therefore, a machine is able to enforce a simple contract 
and with cost reduction (Raskin, ‘The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts’ (n 54) 305 at 315). This is the 
case provided that there is no judicial discretion grounded in legal discretion.  
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assume that software code can only go so far as the if-then clauses. Nowadays, even 
before AI solutions, code programmers can already translate into software very complex 
syllogisms with several alternative conclusions. However, our main critical point relates 
to concept interpretation, whenever it is needed. There are legal concepts such as good 
faith, necessary measures or even proportional outcomes that cannot be translated into 
code language (only into if-then clauses using the concept in its natural language) but are 
fundamental to contract execution and can only be determined, in each situation, by 
interpretation and reasoning.92 These concepts are crucial to allow parts not to make the 
useless effort to foresee all scenarios in contract execution. There are too many costs and 
ultimately, it is an impossible mission. 
Thus, the removal of language ambiguity – which, within administrative law ambiguity, 
reappoints to discretionary legal language, which enables the best singular decision by 
administrative bodies, therefore fulfilling the best public interest pursuit – has 
disadvantages regarding the permanent possibility of adapting the contract to the 
environmental context.93 Eric Tjong Tjin Tai suggests a set of steps in constructing a 
smart contract, while recognising up front a set of difficulties, such as the two mentioned 
above, and adding the need for ‘balancing the relative interests of parties’, which, in the 
future, can be overcome by Artificial Intelligence. For now, smart contracts are very 
simple ones. But, as Merit Kõlvart, Margus Poola, and Addi Rull state ‘if a computer 
program must take care of all the main contractual steps, including pre-contractual 
negotiations, formation and performance of the contract, dispute resolution, and take into 
 
92 In this sense, Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 6; Finck, 
Blockchain, Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 27. 
93 Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright recognise that this ambuiguity ‘provides flexibility to parties 
while also cutting down the time and expense of negotiation. In many cases, vagueness may in fact result 
in more efficient contracts’ (Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 77). 
Regarding this issue in commercial/private law, George G. Triantis, ‘The Efficiency of Vague Contract 
Terms’, Louisiana Law Review 62(4) (2002) 1065-1079. Available at 
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol62/iss4/4. 
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account laws applicable to a particular transaction, then it requires the capability of a very 
advanced artificial intelligence.’94 
 
Secondly, the code language must be confronted with the no-turning back execution 
feature whenever the transaction is made. Particularly, as Michèle Finck stresses, if it is 
unwanted. The other drawbacks have already been pointed out, namely contract execution 
by whom is lacking legal capacity, the issues regarding the default, and the legal 
implementation of contract modifications ordered by court.95  
 
This being said, one must also point out that there is no unanimity regarding the total 
inadequacy of smart contracts related to extraordinary execution or out of estimation 
clauses. In fact, Michèle Finck herself recognises the oracle solution. And other authors, 
like Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright, when addressing that solution, also point out 
its adequacy to ‘interact with real-world persons and potentially react to external 
events’.96 The legal concept of ‘change of circumstances’ can be included in this potential 
reaction. For Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright, the contract parties ‘can refer to an 
oracle to modify payment flows or alter encoded rights and obligations according to 
newly received information’.97 It is true that, in this case, the ‘oracle’ should be a human 
because only humans can make evaluations, weighing factors according to legal criteria.98  
 
94 Kõlvart, Poola and Rull, ‘Smart contracts’ (n 11) 135. 
95 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 5. 
96 Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 75. 
97 Ibid 75. 
98 Considering this dimension, although in general contracts and not public contracts (where there are 
multiple legal constrains), Di Filippi and Wright, ibid 75. 
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Whenever the contractual relationship is further complex, Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron 
Wright propose the hybrid agreements, which can be proven useful whenever ‘open-
ended terms that outline performance obligations’ are set out.99  
Another way of proceeding is the ‘sophisticated smart contract’ that Michèle Finck 
acknowledges. This solution is thought to cover more complex circumstances and 
foresees human intervention with the use of ‘multiple-signature verification (‘MultiSign’) 
whereby the parties need to activate the software with their respective private keys before 
it can execute’.100 In such cases, there is human intervention and therefore the issues 
regarding Article 22 GDPR are avoided.101  
Hence, some solutions are presented, such as outside agreements on overriding rules and 
reliance on third-party input.102 But there are some other legal boundaries between 
contractual parties that can be difficult to comply with, such as interaction and 
communication, as it is very complex to translate such kind of obligations into 
programming language. As the author recognises, the smart contract is fit to ‘allow parties 
to deduce how they should act in certain situations’, but it is unfit to solve discretionary 
situations, including temporal issues.103 In fact, as Max Raskin acknowledges, 
‘automation ensures performance, for better or worse, by excising human discretion from 
contract execution’.104 Therefore, ‘users of smart contracts will have then to accept the 
limitations of smart contracts in providing everything that contract law can provide 
regarding the protection of party interests’.105 
 
99 Ibid 77. See above the distinction between incompletion and immutability or inadequacy to be translated 
into software code. 
100 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 25; Finck, Blockchain, 
Regulation and Governance in Europe (n 4) 27. Explaining the Multisig, Werbach, The Blockchain and the 
New Architecture of Trust (n 6) 109 ff. 
101 See infra. 
102 Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Formalizing Contract Law for Smart Contracts’ (n 60) 1 at 4. 
103 Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Formalizing Contract Law for Smart Contracts’ (n 60) 1 at 7. 
104 Raskin, ‘The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts’ (n 54) 305 at 306. 
105 Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Formalizing Contract Law for Smart Contracts’ (n 60) 1 at 8. 
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Finally, the main questions regarding enforcement, breach and remedies, which, most of 
the times, imply third-party intervention, are not solved.106 Although, regarding simple 
contracts, the oracle solution107 can be applied. Kevin Werbach gives the following 
example: a ‘simple smart contract in which each of the parties has a private key and a 
third key is given to an expert arbitrator. The smart contract requires two of three keys in 
order to execute. If the parties agree the contract has been fully performed, they each 
provide their key and the smart contract executes. If there is a dispute, they turn to the 
arbitrator. She either provides her key along with that of the party seeking to enforce the 
contract or refuses it and therefore prevents completion of the transaction. This system 
mimics a legal arbitration process.’108 But even for some authors, this option does not 
remove the possibility of ultimate Court ruling.109 
All of the disadvantages considered made Michèle Finck doubt whether smart contracts 
are real contracts and smart. In fact, the if-then clauses exclude ‘wider contextual factors’, 
and they need ‘oracles’ to feed the system in order for the if-then clauses to be verified.110 
Therefore, the author adheres to a different concept proposed by Ari Juels, Ahmed Kosba 
and Elaine Shi, namely ‘an autonomously executing piece of code whose inputs and 
outputs can include money’.111 But these features also allow the conclusion that ‘in 
essence, smart contracts are mechanisms designed to achieve the automated execution of 
 
106 Primavera di Filippi and Aaron Wright recognise that ‘Courts ultimately retain jurisdiction over legal 
effects of a smart contract’ (Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 78). 
107 Oracles are external sources, either human or automated data, which feed the smart contract. This feature 
explains why Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright sustain that smart contracts are ‘more dynamic than 
traditional paper-based contracts, because they can be constructed to adjust performance obligations’ (Di 
Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 75). 
108 Werbach, ‘Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’ (n 2) 490 at 548. 
109 Particularly in the United States. See Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code 
(n 2) 79. 
110 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 4. 
111 Ari Juels, Ahmed Kosba and Elaine Shi, ‘The Ring of Gyges: Using Smart Contracts for Crime’. 
Retrieved 4 March 2019 http://www.arijuels.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ Gyges.pdf. Finck, 
‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 4. 
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software code. This makes them a method to automated data processing’.112 If so, as it 
seems, they are in a collision course with the qualified prohibition of ‘solely automated 
data processing’ in the GDPR.113 Therefore, if smart contracts fall under the definition of 
‘solely automated data processing’, the compliance with GDPR imperative provisions 
must be addressed. In fact, they display the two features referred by Michèle Finck: (i) 
they count as ‘a decision based solely on automated processing’; and (ii) that decision 
‘produces legal effects for the data subject’.114 The A29WP guidance establishes that 
solely automated decision-making is ‘the ability to make decisions by technological 
means without human involvement’.115 In order to consider smart contracts to be under 
the Article 22 (1), Michèle Finck proposes two ‘alternative interpretations’: ‘the 
‘decision’ could be considered to simply be the execution of the smart contract code upon 
occurrence of a pre-determined event such as a decision whether a given fact justifies 
payment or reimbursement of a given sum. In line with the very rationale of smart 
contracts, there is no human involvement at the stage of ‘the decision’, meaning that 
Article 22(1) applies to such software’; the other ‘‘decision’ encompasses a broader 
timescale’ and ‘in many circumstances, humans will be agreeing on the purpose and set-
up of the smart contract. Sometimes, a human will act as the oracle feeding the smart 
contract input data needed to execute’.116 
 
 
112 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 6. 
113 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 6. See article 22 (1). 
114 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at  6. 
115 A29WP, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679 (wp251rev.01), 8. Retrieved 4 March 2019 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612053. 
Merit Kõlvart, Margus Poola, and Addi Rull expressly refer that ‘a smart contract is an intelligent agent. In 
other words, it is a computer program capable of making decisions when certain preconditions are met’. 
(Kõlvart, Poola and Rull, ‘Smart contracts’ (n 11) 134). 
116 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 7-8; 9. ‘If human involvement 
in the elaboration of the contract were to be taken into account for the purposes of the first paragraph, there 
would be no need for an explicit exemption to this effect in the second paragraph. 
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3. Mandatory e-procurement and some neighbouring issues 
 
Some of the advantages and disadvantages of Blockchain technology can be found in a 
neighbouring subject much related to public procurement: e-procurement and the 
dematerialization of public procurement procedure117. 
Although its mandatory feature was only set out in 2014 Directives, e-procurement has 
been a goal in EU law. The Green Paper on expanding the use of e-Procurement in the 
EU SEC (2010) 1214 defined e-procurement as ‘the use of electronic communications 
and transaction processing by government institutions and other public sector 
organizations when buying supplies and services or tendering public works’118. An 
electronic procedure within public procurement means much more than the 
dematerialization of the procedure. It includes the legal provision of new phases such as 
electronic auctions (e-auctions) and dynamic purchasing systems. Digital tools are 
considered by EU law as ‘more transparent, evidence-oriented, optimised, streamlined 
and integrated with market conditions’.119 
Concerning the procedure itself, besides the downsizing of administrative costs, 
transparency and efficiency, the electronic procedure also annuls the need for repeated 
documentation submission. As it can be read in some other EU Commission papers 
regarding this issue, the electronic procedure implies the ‘replacement of paper-based 
 
117 For further details regarding the implementation of e-procurment in Portugal, Raquel Carvalho, 
‘Directive 2014/24/EU and Implementation of e-Procurement in Portugal’, European Procurement & 
Public Private Partnership 1 (2019), 43. 
118 Commission, Green Paper on expanding the use of e-procurement in the EU (SEC (2010) 1214 final, 
2010). 
119 Commission, E-procurement, retrieved https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement/e-procurement_en. 
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procedures by ICT-based communications and processing throughout the procurement 
chain. E-Procurement involves the introduction of electronic processes to support the 
distinct phases of a procurement process – publication of tender notices, provision of 
tender documents, submission of tenders, evaluation, award, ordering, invoicing and 
payment’.120 
Currently, though, some critical neighbouring issues have been highlighted in e-
procurement. Despite huge gains in administrative costs (economic efficiency), issues 
have arisen concerning data integrity and protection from the point of view of both 
economic operators and contract authorities when using electronic platforms. 
Furthermore, there are some concerns regarding the system information integration, the 
authentication and identification of the tenderers, interoperability between platforms that 
gather information, and the costs to access them, because these electronic platforms are a 
centralised technology.121 
One of the key issues when using electronic platforms is the need to own several 
timestamps to be able to access different electronic platforms, as it implies a burden and 
cost to economic operators and tenderers. This is one of the reasons why the Portuguese 
law that has transposed article 22 stresses the importance of interoperability, stating in 
article 36 that ‘management companies must comply with the necessary interconnection 
and interoperability among themselves, so that economic operators can choose the 
electronic platform freely, regardless of the one used by the contracting authority’. 
Certificated chain validation is assured by law through electronic, certified mandatory 
signatures.122 
 
120 Commission, Communication on ‘End-to-end e-procurement to modernise public administration’, 2013. 
121 The dematerialisation costs are related to timestamps access, but it has been tried to gradually reduce 
them. 
122 See article 54 of Law 96/2015.  
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Another difficulty has been the upload of tenders and documents, due to technical issues. 
This may be one of the contact points with Blockchain technology, as it already displays 
some of the information contained in those documents, only remaining the 
interoperability and data protection issues. 
Last, but not least, electronic platforms raise data protection issues regarding the security 
and accuracy of both personal data and commercial and industrial secrets. Articles 39 ff. 
of the above-mentioned law provide for the legal regulation concerning these matters and 
establish some duties for the electronic platform’s responsible party. 
Data integrity is seen as a key feature to assure transparency in e-procurement procedures. 
In Portuguese law, these concerns are solved by means of individual accounts and 
authentication, access codes, and the use of timestamps and document encryption. Given 
the importance of the tender and the documents that support it, electronic platforms must 
have archive systems fully accessible within the procedure duration, but only to those 
involved in the procedure, ensuring the secrecy of the proposals within the time to present 
them, which means the need to implement security procedures regarding access and 
cyber-attacks. And after this period of bidding, the proposals and supporting documents 
must remain unchangeable throughout the legal period of maintenance. Yet, these 
documents are only available for this procedure. When another public procurement is 
launched, another electronic procedure begins, along with the same problems and the 
same need to upload documents already uploaded in other procedures… 
 
4. Is Blockchain technology fit for public procurement procedure? 
 
Public procurement is known to be a procedure which embodies transparency, integrity 
and efficiency, but also to be a competitive and risk-averse procedure.  
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4.1. Moments with sensitive issues 
 
Public procurement procedures require tender submission within a preestablished period 
of time and usually, as we have seen, its upload in an electronic platform (at least in public 
procurement procedures above thresholds). Depending on the contract subject, some 
‘private’ data, concerning industrial, commercial or intellectual property, can be involved 
in the proposal.123 The solutions enshrined herein contain the tenderer’s advantage in the 
procedure and are therefore most of the times protected by law (patent law, for instance). 
Simultaneously, the information must remain anonymous and be identifiable only for a 
few people. Then, after the tender submission deadline, normally, all tenderers want to 
access every other tenderer’s proposal and, after the evaluation period, the jury’s 
assessment. This limited transparency fulfils the general goal of transparency and helps 
to build trust among tenderers. 
Therefore, Deividas Soloveicik identifies two moments when confidentiality is a key 
issue within public procurement procedure: (i) when the tenderers want to access 
information on other tenderers’ or bids; and (ii) when the tenderers want to access 
information related to the evaluation of one’s bid.124 The 2014 Public Procurement 
Directives had already addressed this issue.125 Article 21 expressly sets out ‘technical and 
trade secrets’ and ‘confidential aspects of tenderers’ concerning other bids, not 
disregarding internal law protections. On the other hand, article 55 (3) provides that 
 
123 For an analysis of copyright law and blockchain, Finck and Moscon, ‘Copyright Law on Blockchains: 
Between New Forms of Rights Administration and Digital Rights Management 2.0’ (n 4) 77 at 108. 
124 ‘Rethinking the confidentiality in public procurement: does public mean naked public?’, Reprint from 
Procurement Law Journal 1 (2018) 11 at 11. 
125 Articles 21 (1) and 55 (3) of the 2014/24/EU Directive. 
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‘contracting authorities may decide to withhold certain information (…) regarding the 
contract award (…) where the release of such information would impede law enforcement 
or would otherwise be contrary to the public interest, would prejudice the legitimate 
commercial interests of a particular economic operator, whether public or private, or 
might prejudice fair competition between economic operators’.126 This last provision has 
to abide by the general guidance of the obligation to provide the reasoning and grounds 
behind the public procurement decisions.127 
After the award, the successful tenderer must give evidence of the inexistence of 
exclusion grounds. Article 57 of the 2014/24/EU Directive establishes a set of reasons 
that, when present, and regarding the successful tenderer, determine that another tenderer 
must be chosen. Some of them can be overcome by the so-called self-cleaning procedure; 
others by documental proof of inexistence. In fact, the Directive establishes that ‘any 
economic operator that is in one of the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 may 
provide evidence to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient 
to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If 
such evidence is considered enough, the economic operator concerned shall not be 
excluded from the procurement procedure’. In what concerns the exclusion grounds that 
may be overcome by documental proof – breach of obligations relating to the payment of 
taxes or social security contributions – those can be archived in electronic, public, 
platforms. But regarding, for instance, fiscal situations, this circumstance is included at 
 
126 There also some case law where the CJEU has analysed this issue: Case C-450/06, Varec, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:91; C-629/11. Europaïk Dynamiki v. Commission (ESP-ISEP), ELI:EU:C:2012:617; 
Joined Cases T-339/10 and T-532/10, Cosepuri v. EFSA (EFSA), ECLI:EU:T:2013:38. 
127 Soloveicik, ‘Rethinking the confidentiality in public procurement: does public mean naked public?’(n 
123) 11 at 23. 
   Being critical about the ‘excessive transparency’ in public procurement, Albert Sanchez Graells, ‘The 
difficult balance between transparency and competition in public procurement: some recent trends in the 
case law of European Courts and a look at the new Directives’, University of Leicester School of Law 
Research Paper No. 13 – 11, 2013, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2353005. 
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least in the concept of confidential information and, therefore, benefits from both 
constitutional and legal protection. 
 
Therefore, this is a sensitive issue for the law regarding both data protection and public 
procurement rules. At some point of public procurement procedure, some personal data 
and private data are required. The former mostly regarding solvency, fiscal and social 
security compliance; the latter, commercial or/and industrial property that substantiate 
every tenderer’s advantage.  
The innovation feature regarding the use of electronic platforms has raised quite a few 
critical issues that are precisely connected to those requirements. So, naturally, the main 
question that comes to mind is whether there is room for Blockchain as a solution for 
granting transparency and the necessary accuracy and truthfulness of data, overcoming 
the key issues regarding the ‘traditional’ use of electronic platforms in public procurement 
procedure.128 
The latest Directives show a deep concern regarding this trilogy: there are numerous 
provisions respecting announcements and information disclosure; new dispositions 
concerning conflicts of interests and exclusion grounds; and some provisions are aimed 
to achieve more efficiency by making, for instance, e-procurement mandatory. 
Although innovation is one of the pillars of the latest Directives, and such a system is 
undoubtedly innovative, one must not forget that the search for the ‘best value for money’ 
must be accompanied by some guarantees, mainly within two important moments of the 
public procurement proceeding: when economic operators present their proposals, and 
when they must prove their integrity, demonstrating that there are no grounds for 
 
128 Concerning public contract execution, that is a somewhat different question. 
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exclusion. The former usually includes sensitive information regarding the commercial 
or industrial status, while the latter relates to personal and sensitive information which is 
legally protected as fundamental rights under both the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and constitutional law and sometimes relies on confidentiality. 
Hence, is there irreconcilability between this qualification and both the permission of 
broad access to it and the ‘impossibility’ of its withdrawal from that kind of system?  
 
4.2. Comparing technological solutions within the drawbacks and difficulties identified 
This being the framework, can Blockchain technology be useful in overcoming the 
shortness of actual e-procurement solutions? Is it a better and more suitable choice than 
traditional electronic platforms? 
According to Roland Berger, there are some prerequisites that have to be fulfilled to 
define ‘a meaningful use case of blockchain’: i) Do you need a shared database?, ii) Do 
you need read and write access for multiple users?, iii) Do users mistrust each other?, and 
iv) Do you want to avoid an intermediary?129 If we pose these questions to a contracting 
authority within public procurement procedure, the answer to all the questions will be 
most probably positive:  
(i) yes, in public procurement, a database is needed because there is information regarding 
the tenders and/or candidates;  
(ii) the information within must be read not only by the contracting authority (and the 
internal bodies that will assess the tenders) but also by all the economic operators when 
the period of maintenance of proposals is finished. The importance and the role of the 
 
129 Berger, ‘Blockchain – A Promising Technology for the Belgian Public Administration’ (n 2). 
Página 32 de 46 
 
access can be slightly different: contracting authorities must access to verify the 
fulfilment of legal requirements and to evaluate; the candidates/economic operators, to 
fulfil a democratic role, regarding transparency;  
(iii) although at first, all the economic operators need to access and upload documents, 
after the tender presentation period is finished, it is crucial that the accuracy of the 
information supporting the tender is untampered so that the comparison among all tenders 
is as equal and transparent as possible; 
(iv) this immutability alongside other ‘immutabilities’ such as those of the criteria and 
evaluation factors and the absence of intermediaries (important to diminish the risk of 
tampering130) grants that each tender stays as it was uploaded, sustaining trust and 
decision-making transparency among economic operators in public procurement. 
Although interested in a transparent procedure, all economic operators in public 
procurement remain as competitors.  
If the public administration cannot answer all questions affirmatively, and the question 
regarding mistrust cannot be answered, then only a shared data-base is needed.131 
As for data storage, can Blockchain provide a better solution? Normally, the public-
produced information such as fiscal and social security compliance and criminal records 
is stored in databases, not accessible to all, precisely due to the private or protected feature 
of the data. But as Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright stress, ‘like all fortresses, 
however, even the most secure data centres have vulnerabilities. (…) Blockchains are 
viewed as a new tool to build more reliable and transparent government registers and 
 
130 Tamper-resistance is one of the attractive key features.  
131 Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 6. Nevertheless, public 
procurement rules impose a lot of guarantees that favour trust: the broad publicity of the competition and 
the procurement documents, the notification of the choice, the grants that the contracting authority has to 
provide to conclude the contract, and so on. 
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record-keeping systems to modernise and increase secure critical information’.132 This is 
a different dimension of Blockchain usage: not for public procurement itself but for the 
present database-stored information. As data integrity is a much-needed asset in public 
procurement, Blockchain technology can offer it, provided that the data uploaded is 
accurate in itself. This guarantee, however, is given outside the Blockchain technology, 
as the uploaded of information is carried out by public authorities. Therefore, whenever 
inner accuracy is non-arguable, immutability and traceability are the features that can 
assure that integrity.133 As Jason Killmeyer, Mark White, and Bruce Chew stress, ‘a 
blockchain database retains the complete and indelible history of all transactions, assets, 
and instructions executed since the first one’.134 Therefore, it is possible, at any moment, 
to reconstruct all the data inserted and the respective date. 
Hence, an option as such could be very interesting for public procurement procedures if 
the interoperability issues and data protection issues were to be guarded against. 
 
It is also unarguable that a Blockchain system acknowledged by different entities at its 
various stages provides a prominent level of transparency, because validation is not 
carried out by one single entity.135  
However, in public procurement, the principle of transparency is not the primary 
regulation. It must be adjusted and harmonised with the competition principle, which 
 
132 Killmeyer, White and Chew, ‘Will Blockchain Transform the Public Sector? Blockchain Basics for 
Government’ (n 2). These remarks can also be made or be useful regarding the register of property assets 
or commercial/industrial inventions. 
133 Concerning traceability, every transaction is signed and timestamped. 
134 Killmeyer, White and Chew, ‘Will Blockchain Transform the Public Sector? Blockchain Basics for 
Government’ (n 2). 
135 However, as Lin William Cong and Zhiguo He say, ‘empirical evidence suggests that greater information 
sharing indeed facilitates collusion’ Cong and He, ‘Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts’ (n 29) 27. 
About collusion in Blockchain and Smart contracts, see Thibault Schrepel, ‘Collusion by Blockchain and 
Smart Contracts’ Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 33. 14 January 2019. Available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3315182 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315182). 
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sometimes collides with transparency, and this feature has important consequences to the 
Blockchain governance. In fact, during public procurement procedure, there are stages 
with broad publicity, followed by other with restrictive solutions, and broad publicity 
again at the end. So, a unique Blockchain solution could never be suitable. 
We are currently at a sensitive crossroad. If we use a Blockchain system, data are verified 
and therefore accessible and guaranteed as they are uploaded. Yet, legal systems protect 
and reserve that information at a prominent level, namely at a constitutional level. Who, 
then, decides what information is verified in the Blockchain? Who is accountable for that 
decision? Who authenticates the data uploaded? Is there an obligation to feed that kind of 
system? Will it be mandatory to allow personal or business information to be kept in that 
kind of system to be able to participate in public procurement proceedings? If the data 
provider can be, to a certain level, the data controller, is this solution suitable for all kinds 
of personal data? Are there technical remedies for these concerns within the Blockchain 
system? 
Let us address and test sensitive data within public procurement procedure. Would the 
existence of a Blockchain containing the sensitive information regarding exclusion 
grounds be possible? The public procurement procedure running on an electronic 
platform could be interoperable with a Blockchain solution if and when the contracting 
authority needed to consult that kind of information.136 The data would be more reliable. 
For such a scenario, in terms of governance, what could be the most suitable solution: a 
public/permissionless blockchain accessible through private keys, with encrypted 
information and the information owner as the sole responsible for the accuracy of data;137 
 
136 As we have already seen, the oracle solution can be applied to this situation. Whenever public records, 
while containing sensitive or even personal data, could be functioning as an oracle to the procurement 
procedure, this is a viable way to proceed. 
137 The solution presented like this is a very simplified description as some relevant personal information, 
in order to be trustworthy, has to be produced by public authorities such as Fiscal Administration or Social 
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or a private one, with a gatekeeper and limited access? Access would be temporary – only 
for each procedure and within procedure rules – and the cost of uploading documents 
would be considerably decreased.  
The interoperability solution could probably solve some of the risks that are nowadays a 
concern in centralised electronic procurement: traceability; immutability of data; 
accuracy and transparency.138  
Concerning immutability, although being an interesting feature when considering 
information trust, it could also pose a disturbing question: how would it be possible to 
redraw a proposal if a tenderer changed his mind, or replace the uploaded proposal for 
another before the deadline for submission? This immutability feature is very useful 
during the maintenance period of the proposals, fulfilling the Directive’s goal regarding 
equal competition. But it is not always a desirable feature in all the stages of public 
procurement procedure. 
One can consider using Blockchain to implement a public procurement procedure, i.e., to 
conclude a contract. The procedure rules would need to be translated into code, from the 
rules to present proposals, including the proposal evaluation formula with criteria award, 
to the rules to exclude proposals and tenders, the habilitation rules and, the best tender 
having been chosen, the rules of contract execution.  
This option would benefit from Blockchain’s transparency and immutability features. The 
tenderer, with his key, consults the rules, develops his tender and then uploads it, fulfilling 
 
Services or even by a Government Department (for instance, regarding criminal records). Although the data 
is personal, its trustworthiness and accuracy need to be verified and attested to a different person.  
138 Joseph Huntington La Cascia, reflecting upon the use of Blockchain in public procurement in the context 
of World Bank business, sustains that this technology is particularly fit to e-procurement systems as ‘every 
procurement transaction is on a ledger’. And ‘blockchain can streamline the process by integrating with 
other systems more easily through smart contracts’ (Joseph Huntington La Cascia, ‘Blockchain Lessons for 
Procurement’. Retrieved 5 December 2018 https://wbnpf.procurmentinet.org/featured/blockchain-lessons-
procurment.) 
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all the security requirements, such as the signature key. As the deadline to upload the 
tenders is enshrined in the code, when it has passed, the Blockchain no longer allows the 
upload of more tenders. Then the tender evaluation begins, which can also be made by 
the Blockchain technology, applying the evaluation formula. This option grants a much 
more unbiased outcome. From this point on, tenders’ graduation is uploaded to the 
Blockchain and the consultation period is open to all tenderers. Afterwards, depending 
on the legal regulation of public contracts, the chosen tenderer must prove his/her 
personal integrity, comply with other formal and substantial requirements and conclude 
the contract to be executed.139 
This Blockchain solution would also allow citizens to consult not only the tenders and the 
evaluation formula (and its outcome), but also the concluded contract, as a transparency 
and democratic control measure, becoming an instrument to fight corruption in public 
procurement procedures.140 Corruption has become a major problem in some countries, 
and the European legislator has established some provisions concerning this problem. 
However, whenever discretionary powers are provided for in the evaluation stage of 
public procedures, there is the inherent risk of human intervention. The use of technology 
in the assessment will naturally decrease the likelihood of bias.  
This option would imply a complex programming system and it is very likely that, for 
each public procedure, a specific Blockchain would be created. Each public procurement 
 
139 Analysing a similar procedure, Freya Sheer Hardwick, Raja Naeem Akram, and Konstantinos 
Markantonakis, ‘Fair and Transparent Blockchain based Tendering Framework – A Step towards Open 
Governance’. 2018. arXiv:1805.05844v1 [cs.CR] 15 May 2018 (DOI: 
10.1109/TrustCom/BigDataSE.2018.00185), 1. 
140 Referring to the ‘futility of traditional legal responses to procurement corruption’, Sope Williams-Elegbe 
has shifted her research in this subject to the Blockchain solution and its use in public procurement 
procedure (Sope Williams-Elegbe, ‘Public Procurement, Corruption and Blockchain Technology: A 
Preliminary (Legal) Inquiry’ (n 85)). 
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procedure has its specific features concerning contractual provisions from the contracting 
authority.  
As we have already seen above, technology cannot yet address complex demands of 
public buyers, as their needs are related to public interest and therefore difficult to be put 
into mandatory, non-discretionary provisions only. Discretion is a legal instrument 
necessary to allow public officials to make the best administrative decision within the law 
and the bounding pursuit of public interest. Put differently, the mere disappearance of 
administrative discretionary powers is not the solution. Blockchain can be added to the 
existing measures, benefitting from the interoperability with some databases or oracles 
(whether human or electronic platforms), but for now it has some other drawbacks, for 
instance, how to apply legal safeguards concerning personal data, commercial and 
industrial secrets guaranteed by law. Personal data and commercial/industrial assets are 
protected under EU and constitutional law. Therefore, there must always be legal and 
technological measures to safeguard them. Which means that this solution must enshrine 
these legal safeguards within the code, and therefore the functioning of the Blockchain 
technology.141 
Personal data protection is a very outstanding question nowadays.142 Under the GDPR, 
as we have already seen, ‘solely automated data processing’ is forbidden. This is a risk 
that could be met in public procurement procedure running in a Blockchain solution. 
There would be some stages where an automated decision could be made regarding 
economic operators: for instance, concerning evaluating the existence of exclusion 
grounds. Some of them could probably be verified in an automated way whenever they 
 
141 Referring this option, recognising nevertheless the difficulty to deploy it, Nini Rose Moru. 2018. 
‘Blockchain Can and Will End Public Procurement Corruption’. Retrieved 5 December 2018 
https://en.decentral.news/public-procurement-blockchain/.  
142 Expressly referring that ‘the application of EU data protection law to blockchain-based platforms raises 
difficult questions’, Bacon, Michels, Millard and Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’ (n 30). 
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are set out in precise legal terms.143 It is the case of taxes or social security debts, even 
though in some legal systems, like the Portuguese, if there is a judicial dispute regarding 
taxes with given guarantee, it is considered that there is no debt. But, on the other hand, 
some other grounds of exclusion imply the discretionary decision of the contracting 
authority and even the possibility of running the self-cleaning process. Therefore, solely 
the habilitation phase poses two questions. First, not all foreseen grounds of exclusion 
could dismiss human intervention: a part of it could run automated; another part could 
not. Secondly, the exclusion grounds, when applied, have relevant effects on tenderers. 
Almost the same reasoning can be made, earlier, in the tender’s evaluation stage, 
regarding the grounds to exclude the proposals. The foreseen grounds to exclude 
proposals are not drawn with the same precision; for some, an automated decision could 
be made, for others not.  
In the given examples, the exclusion (either of the proposal or the chosen tenderer) made 
in a solely automated process effectively falls under article 22 (1) as it produces the effect 
of hindering the continuance in the public procedure and eventually becoming the 
contractual partner of the contracting authority. This is a legal effect. Of course, one must 
verify if the exceptions foreseen in Article 22 (2) are applicable: if the parties are entering 
into (or performance of) a contract between the data subject and the controller; if the 




143 See above the question of automated processes and GDPR. 
144 For further details on the exceptions, Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ 
(n 18) 1 at 11 ff. This last possibility generates several questions regarding the extent of the information, 
i. e. who the responsible for giving the information is, considering the blockchain underneath, and so on. 
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Secondly, and leaving behind the first and determinant issue of being an automated 
process, one must reflect upon the specific procedure requirements within public 
procurement regarding the tender’s evaluation. The key factor in evaluation is the award 
criterion, which is an important dimension to achieve ‘sustainable procurement’. 
The concept of ‘sustainable procurement’ is very uncertain and difficult. For long a time, 
some other and partial expressions such as ‘social clause’, ‘fair procurement’, ‘ethical 
procurement’, and ‘green procurement’ were used instead. The concept of sustainability 
itself is connected with public procurement, mainly related to the implementation of green 
and social policies. This context partially explains why Christopher McCrudden wonders 
if the umbrella concept [sustainable procurement] helps understand ‘the commodities of 
social and green public purchasing or serve[s] only to camouflage their essential 
differences’.145 Sustainability, however, has been a constant concern in the European 
Union, and it has already been established in article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (‘TFEU’). But it is with the Lisbon 2020 Strategy – A strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth146 – which has elected sustainability as one of the 
most important goals for its ‘vision of Europe’s social market economy for the 21st 
century’, that the issue has gained more visibility. Focusing on sustainable growth as a 
particular domain of sustainability, the Commission aims to ‘promot[e] a more resource 
efficient, greener and more competitive economy’.  Therefore, the 2020 Strategy foresees 
the development of ‘new processes and technologies, including green technologies, 
accelerating the roll out of smart grids using ICTs, exploiting EU-scale networks, and 
reinforcing the competitive advantages of our businesses, particularly in manufacturing 
 
145 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes’, Natural Resources 
Forum 28 (2004) 257 at 266. 
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and within our SMEs, as well through assisting consumers to value resource efficiency. 
Such an approach will help the EU to prosper in a low-carbon, resource constrained world 
while preventing environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and unsustainable use of 
resources. It will also underpin economic, social and territorial cohesion’.  
 
Public procurement has always been set out as a primary instrument to promote the 
Internal Market in a preferentially economic feature. However, since the 2004 Directives, 
the European legislator has been assuming broader purposes for public procurement. 
Public contracts may and should be used by Member States to promote the initially 
secondary, nowadays horizontal policies as well, namely environmental and social ones.  
Still, it is also important to enshrine other prominent features within this broad concept 
such as IT, with the fostering of e-procurement, and small enterprises’ policy access to 
procurement market, which is why it is now important to use the ‘sustainable 
procurement’ concept, as public procurement contributes to ‘global sustainability: 
balancing of social and economic development, ensuring the fundamentals of equality of 
life for all people, within the ecological boundaries of the planet’. Sustainable 
procurement should not be confused with green public procurement, as the first ‘also 
emphasizes concern for the social and economic aspects of procurement’. In the same 
path, the United Nations have already proclaimed that ‘sustainable Procurement seeks to 
achieve the appropriate balance between the three pillars of sustainable development i.e. 
economic, social and environmental’. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that ‘the 
European Commission describes sustainable procurement as a policy instrument that 
relies on market dynamics rather than the law’. Besides, the concept of sustainable 
procurement is very workable within the Circular Economy Policy the European Union 
has also been embracing. And the Life Cycling Cost factor (LCC) within the award 
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criterion gives a major contribution to build and deepen it. In its COM (2015) 614 final 
Communication of 2/12/2015, the Commission stated that ‘by stimulating activity in key 
sectors and new business opportunities […] under the umbrella of EU’s Horizon 2020 
[…] there are comprehensive commitments in several areas including public 
procurement’. And that ‘Public procurement accounts for a large proportion of European 
consumption (nearly 20% of EU GDP). It can therefore play a key role in the circular 
economy, and the Commission will encourage this role through its actions on Green 
Procurement’. 
As Dacian Dragos/Bogdana Neamtu stress, creating ‘an umbrella framework to green and 
social public procurement is far more complicated’. 147  And Oshani Perera poses the 
following question: ‘in the rush to stimulate ‘quick wins’ and flagship initiatives to 
promote sustainable public procurement, are governments overlooking the critical 
importance of demonstrating ‘value for money’ and the business case for sustainable 
public procurement?’, concluding that ‘without LCC methodologies to demonstrate this, 
SPP policies run the risk of being side lined or even abandoned on the premise that 
sustainable goods and services are more expensive’. And wonders if ‘procurers and 
sustainable procurement policy-makers have the expertise to interpret LCC analyses to 
demonstrate the value for the public purse’.148 
Two of the legal instruments used in the 2014 Directives to pursue sustainable 
procurement were technical specifications and award criteria rules. Within the latter, the 
life-cycle costing factor appears as a significant factor to appraise the proposal’s cost.149 
 
147 Dacian Dragos and Bogdana Neamtu, ‘Life-Cycle Costing for Sustainable Public Procurement in the 
European Union’, in: Beate Sjäfjell and Anya Wiesbrock (eds.), Sustainable Public Procurement under EU 
Law – New Perspectives on the State as Stakeholder (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 116. 
148 Oshani Perera, ‘Life Cycle Costing in Sustainable Public Procurement: A Question of Value’, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) December 2009, 3 
149 Both concepts (sustainable procurement and life-cycle costing) are non-legal, interdisciplinary concepts, 
turning its content far more complex.  
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According to the 2014 Directives, we can state that the contract award criterion is ‘the 
most economically advantageous tender’ in a multifactorial model or in a single factorial 
model (best price). Depending on the contract object and its complexity, contracting 
authorities choose the award criteria. The object contract is also determinant to the larger 
or smaller degree of clauses’ complexity. The MEAT criterion, with its multiple factors, 
is a better tool to assess several features of the procedure and favours the pursuit of 
sustainability by demanding from the market solutions regarding less energy consumption 
goods, low carbon solutions, ecolabel products, the implementation of social policies 
regarding disability employment, social services, or fair commerce. All these 
requirements are very demanding in what concerns the MEAT criterion design and its 
evaluation. 
The simplest award criterion is the best price, as it can be related to a simple mathematic 
comparison. Whenever the MEAT criterion is used, EU law imposes the display of the 
graduation formula, with the factor’s weight clearly explained, before the period of 
proposals presentation. Not all the factors are mathematically described, though. As 
regards those displayed in a formula, it could be easier to translate them into software 
code. But, if technical specifications are drawn in a discretionary way, embedding 
concepts such as quality measures or adequate measures, that formula needs human 
intervention. Or, if the formula establishes an evaluation frame, with a gap, there has to 
be a human decision accompanied by reasoning. All these determinations make the use 
of Blockchain technology harder. 
For now, and within the scope of the Directives, EU Member States have to comply with 
the award rules. The Public Procurement Directives allow a discretionary transposition 
of those rules, but there are also some significant boundaries that confine the extent of 
different rules. For instance, award criteria that favour national economic operators or do 
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not respect cross-border competition must be put aside. Therefore, some experiences of 
Northern European countries regarding alternative ways of procurement methods must 
be closely addressed within Directives provisions. Those methods can be related to the 
organisational bodies involved in evaluation such as external juris or assessment 
committees (which must nevertheless obey procurement procedures rules concerning 
assessment);150 but the methods can be innovative ones, not foreseen in the Directives, 
such as Best Value Procurement (concessions)151 or societal contracting.152/153 
Some of the innovative features of BVP (or, at least similar ones) can actually be found 
in the present Public Procurement Directives: the consideration of past performance (in 
order to exclude economic operators)154; preliminary market consultations as an 
important tool in the preparation phase;155 competitive dialogue, where the solution to the 
public authority is being built with the economic operators selected; and innovation 
partnerships.156 
 
150 This kind of organisational dimension could eventually function within blockchain technology and some 
of its features, namely the trust-built, could be very useful. Whenever, the context of human intervention 
broadens, the risk of discrimination or/and corruption grows. 
151 BVP solution was developed in United States and it has been used in the Netherlands. It aims to increase 
the project ‘by mitigating risks and increasing the transparency by underscoring the pre-award phase’. 
(Arnoud Storteboom, Paulus Wondimu, Jardar Lohne and Ola Laedre, ‘Best Value Procurement – The 
Practical Approach in The Netherlands’, Procedia Computer Science 121 (2017) 398). Economic operators 
are asked to help the contracting authority in the identification of the risks throughout the procedure chain. 
It is said that this method reduces ‘complexity, duration and cost while increasing the quality’, by using the 
vendor’s expertise (‘ibid 398 at 400). So, ‘changes the procurement agent’s role from being the guardian 
over the award of a contract, to a facilitator of the delivery of expert services’ (Jeroen van de Rijt, Sicco C. 
Santema, ‘The Best Value Approach in the Netherlands: A Reflection on Past, Present and Future’, Journal 
for the Advancement of Performance Information and Value 4(2) (2012) 147). The designed procedure 
embodies some automated processes. Presenting a matrix with the full explanation of the BVP method, 
Storteboom, Wondimu, Lohne and Laedre, ‘Best Value Procurement – The Practical Approach in The 
Netherlands’ (n 150) 398 at 402). For an analysis in the road construction sector, Narmo M.,Wondimu P.A, 
Lædre O. ‘Best Value Procurement (BVP) in a Mega Infrastructure Project’, in: González, V.A. (ed.), Proc. 
26th Annual Conference of the International. Group for Lean Construction (IGLC), Chennai, India, 33. 
152 ‘A type of public procurement in which citizens are given the opportunity to be involved in the 
performance of the project’ (‘Towards a coherent and efficient legal framework for public procurement 
law’, Public Procurement Research Centre. Retrieved http://www.pprc.eu/english/research/). 
153 These are two examples of new ways in research fields within public procurement. 
154 Article 57 (4), g) of the 2014/24/EU Directive. 
155 Article 40 of the 2014/24/EU Directive. 
156 Article 31 of the 2014/24/EU Directive. 
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Finally, is the ‘smart contract’ a useful, workable tool within public procurement, namely 
regarding contract execution? 
Although in public procurement within the European Union it is possible to harmonise 
some ground rules about contract law (mainly in contract formation and now with a few 
rules concerning public contracts execution), that possibility does not present itself in 
other contractual areas. This impossibility relates mainly to the different States’ legal 
framework, historically determined.157 
In public procurement, a harmonisation effort is being made regarding procedure rules. 
But the provisions that regulate the parties’ obligations have always been a matter of 
national discretion. However, the latest Public Procurement Directives have included 
some rules concerning the execution of public contracts. Nevertheless, one must bear in 
mind that the reasoning beneath that legislative option is related to competition issues, 
not having any intention to harmonise contractual rules. 
Therefore, in some cases, smart contracts (or part of them) can fall under Article 22 (1) 
of GDPR, because there are decisions made solely by automated process with significant 
effects to subjects. 158 
Hence, applying Blockchain technology to public procurement must be accompanied by 
personal data safeguards.  
This contextualization explains the so-called ‘Sophisticated Smart Contracts’: they 
depend on law ‘for recognition, and conversely, large-scale adoption’, and the arbitration 
clause could be an instrument ‘towards GDPR compliance’.159 
 
157 However, the effort made by European Union regarding Private law must be stressed with ‘Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)’, 
always pulled by the legal force of Directives. 
158 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 28. 
159 Finck, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection in the European Union’ (n 18) 1 at 24 ff. 
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Regarding public contract execution, and bearing in mind the procedure rules, I can only 
foresee supply public contracts as a possibility. This kind of contracts can have very 
simple clauses and/or the contracting authority can fully describe the supply good features 
in the procedure documents, which means that the only requirement under competition is 
the price. This is, in my opinion, the most suitable scenario for a smart contract execution. 
Not only the remaining clauses ought to be very simple, but the execution conditions as 
well, in order to, first of all, be translated into code. Hence, only a few public contracts, 
namely simple supply contracts, with all specifications very literally drawn, could allow 
a Blockchain performance. But even then, data protection issues could arise. 
So, smart contracts are not a useful tool for work contracts or concessions.160 Those 
contracts have very complex legal rules to comply with, the technical specifications are 
not translatable into programming code as they lack the traditional logic enshrined in 
programming language, and their execution lingers in time. This lingering could imply 
contract modifications regarding a change of circumstances, or to accommodate the best 
public interest pursuit, and not all of them are previously predictable, nor translatable into 
software code.  
5. Conclusion 
 
Blockchain technology provides a set of interesting features for public procurement 
procedures. In abstract terms, it can be used both in public procurement procedures and 
contract execution. However, to implement such a possibility, some drawbacks must be 
addressed. It is difficult to turn most of the law provisions into code language, and, when 
 
160 Primavera Di Filippi and Aaron Wright also recognise that smart contracts ‘– at least for the immediate 
future – will not be able to account for these more open-ended rights and obligations, which are neither 
binary nor highly formulaic’ (Di Filippi and Wright, Blockchain and the Law – The Rule of Code (n 2) 77). 
They were analysing contracts outside public procurement, but their conclusion is perfectly suitable within 
our reflexion. 
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that is possible, they are not fully workable. It is necessary to grant the protection of 
Fundamental rights concerning personal data, intellectual property and commercial and 
industrial secrets (patents). The banishment of human interference in public procurement 
procedures may seem the needed instrument to solve corruption issues in public 
procurement, but, considering the complexity of public contracts, also visible in the 
public procurement procedure, it is impossible to totally banish human intervention. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to choose one single kind of Blockchain. The public 
procurement complexity appears to suggest that a permissioned solution combined with 
other oracles solutions could be the best option. One must bear in mind that when it comes 
to open public procedures, there should be initial open access, which should be closed 
(and only accessible to tenderers and contracting authorities) when the proposal’s 
deadline presentation ends and remain like this until contract conclusion. Then, broader 
publicity would be needed again for community knowledge.  
Despite the possibility to address some of the actual problems concerning the use of 
electronic platforms, as the present technology used in public procurement, Blockchain 
still presents some real constraints.  
The world is evolving, and technology is unstoppable. Law and technology must be 
development partners. Yet, here, we are just starting the path! 
 
